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BRITAIN, BLACKS, AND BUSING 
.Derrick Bell* 
DOING Gooo BY DOING LITTLE: RACE AND SCHOOLING IN 
BRITAIN. By .David L. Kirp. Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 1979. Pp. xi, 164. $11.95. 
-
"Do something even if it's wrong," is a nonsensical, usually 
counterproductive, but nevertheless frequently followed admonition 
that accurately describes this country's current school desegregation 
policy. Here we are twenty-seven years after the Supreme Court first 
acknowledged what blacks had always known: that coerced school 
segregation is a constitutional wrong and an educational evil. 1 And 
yet today, proponents and opponents of racial balance and busing 
remedies still defend or attack these techniques with a frenzy far out 
of proportion to their importance in obtaining the equal educational 
opportunity proinised in Brown. 
And as the battle over busing rages, it is quite clear that its out-
come will not alter the demographic facts which render the busing 
debate so irrelevant to so many minority children. More than half of 
the nation's minority children attend schools in urban districts which 
are approximately 60% nonwhite and therefore beyond the possibil-
ity of integrating on the racial balance model. The average minority 
population in the nation's ten largest districts was 68.2% five years 
ago and is likely higher today.2 
Nor has the resistance to school desegregation lessened. Anti-
busing riders and other legislative schemes designed to discourage 
school desegregation policies remain popular in the Congress. 3 
States have enacted laws and even amended their constitutions in 
efforts to ban or substantially limit busing for school desegregation.4 
\ 
• Dean, University of Oregon Law School. A.B. 1952, Duquesne University; LL.B. 1957, 
University of Pit~burgh. - Ed. 
I. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
2. Ravitch, The "White Flight" Controversy, 51 Pue. INTEREST 135, 146-47 (1978). The 
nonwhite population of Britain, about 3% of the total population, is far smaller than that of 
America, in which 15% of the population are minorities (p. I 17). 
3. Efforts to attach anti-busing riders to appropriations bills delayed the adjournment of 
the lame-duck session of the 96th Congress. See, e.g., Senate Props Curb on U.S. Busing Suits 
.from Financing Bill, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1980, at I, col. I. 
4. See, e.g., North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43 (1971), affirming a 
lower court order striking down a statute that prohibited assignment or involuntary busing of 
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Although the courts, including the Supreme Court, have not aban-
doned the Brown mandate in the face of widespread opposition, the 
days when the Supreme Court spoke with one voice in resolving 
school desegregation issues are long passed.5 Slim majorities are 
found to affirm most school desegregation orders, but only on the 
basis that the facts of those cases reach restrictive standards of liabil-
ity that cannot be satisfied in those districts where metropolitan rem-
edies hold the only hope for classical desegregation through racial 
balance techniques.6 There is even less chance that further relief can 
be obtained in systems where once desegregated schools not uncom-
monly become resegregated through white flight and changes in 
neighborhood and racial patterns. 7 
Black parents have become disenchanted with the slow progress 
of school desegregation. They recognize, often to a greater extent 
than civil rights lawyers, the small gains in academic achievement 
that come from the large sacrifice involved in sending black children 
across town to mainly white schools. 8 While the Supreme Court has 
not found it necessary to hear any of the cases raising the issue, it is 
quite possible that within the next year or so, it will be faced with the 
paradox of black parents who have gone to court in order to prevent 
school boards from assigning black children to mainly white schools. 
students to create a racial balance. California, by a November 1971 referendum, amended its 
constitution to prohibit its state courts from ordering racial balance and busing remedies un-
less federal courts in similar circumstances would be authorized under the federal Constitution 
to order such remedies. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7 (West 1980). 
5. See generally, Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation: Decisionmaking in tl1e 
Supreme Court, 1948-1958, 68 GEO. L.J. I (1979). 
Actually, the effort to issue unanimous decisions lasted only a decade after Brown. Justices 
Clark and Harlan added a one-sentence dissent in Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 
(1964). The Court spoke unanimously in both Greene v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 
(1968), and in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. I (1971). Beginning 
with Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), the close 5-4 decision reversing a metropolitan-
wide desegregation plan, divided decisions became expected rather than exceptional. Indeed, 
in an earlier case with metropolitan-type relief in issue, an equally divided Court affirmed the 
lower court's refusal of relief in Bradley v. School Bd., 382 U.S. 103 (1965). See also Dayton 
Board of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979) (5-4 decision); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. 
Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979) (7-2 decision). And in its most recent effort, the Court could not 
finally agree that it wanted to decide the appeal of Dallas, Texas, school case, in litigation 
stretching back to 1953. Tasby v. Estes, 572 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. granted sub nom. 
Estes v. Metropolitan Branches of the Dallas NAACP, 440 U.S. 906 (1979), cert. dismissed as 
improvidently granted, 444 U.S. 437 (1980). 
6. Compare Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979) with Milliken v. Brad-
ley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
7. See Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976). 
8. Reasons why plaintiffs' lawyers in school cases may continue seeking racial balance 
remedies in opposition to black parents' preferences are discussed in Bell, Serving Two Mas-
ters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 
470 (1976). The uncertain effects of school desegregation are reviewed in N. ST. JOHN, 
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION: OUTCOMES FOR CHILDREN (1975). 
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These parents will not be urging a reversal of Brown, but they will be 
insisting on a reading of Brown that emphasizes equal educational 
opportunity directly rather than the traditional call for racial balance 
with educational opportunity serving as an assumed by-product.9 
Through it all, civil rights agencies committed to bringing about 
an integrated society through the mechanism of school desegregation 
remain steadfast. They are deterred neither by political opposition, 
judicial weariness on the issues, nor critics within the civil rights 
ranks. 10 But the situation grows worse. Even in most desegregated 
settings, racial understanding has not improved. Indeed, quite the 
opposite result has too often been the case. 
Given the current confusion, it is not unreasonable to try to de-
termine whether other countries have faced similar racial problems 
in their public schools, and resolved them with greater efficiency and 
sensitivity than has been the case here. Professor David L. Kirp, a 
long-time observer of the desegregation scene in this country, has led 
the search for other answers with an interesting review of the British 
experience.11 
.Doing Good By .Doing Little is the result of Kirp's investigation. 
He brings a cold and sometimes disconcerting objectivity to his find-
ings, but in the end, his approach perhaps makes a greater impact 
because the reader is led to reach conclusions that are not only obvi-
ous, but also discouraging. For it is apparent that in both Britain 
and the United States, school policies are influenced by priorities 
that favor white over nonwhite interests whenever a choice between 
the two must be made. This is not to minimize the substantially dif-
ferent dimensions of the race problem in British schools. But there 
are parallels that recall and sometimes reflect the American experi-
ence. Not the least of these similarities is the obstacles faced by both 
countries in reconciling racial equality rhetoric with the political 
9. The Supreme Court has agreed to review a case brought by black parents in Chicago 
who were barred from enrolling their children in the high schools near their residences by the 
working of the Board's voluntary desegregation plan that set a ceiling on the number of blacks 
permitted to attend the two high schools in order to forestall white flight. The Board modified 
the plan to provide free bus transportation to other integrated high schools for black children 
excluded from the schools where the racial quota was in effect. The court of appeals affirmed 
the district court's approval of this plan. Johnson v. Board of Educ., 604 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 
1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 3055 (1980), vacated, 101 S. Ct. 339 (Oct. 20, 1980). 
10. Serious questions regarding the continued viability of racial balance remedies and edu-
cationally oriented alternatives are discussed in SHADES OF BROWN: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON 
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (D. BELL ed. 1980). 
I l. See, e.g., Kirp, Fine & Angelides, .Desegregation, Politics, and the Courts: Race and 
Schooling Policy in Richmond, Cal!fomia, 88 AM. J. Eouc. 32 (1979); Kirp, Race, Politics, and 
the Courts: School .Desegregation in San Francisco, 46 HARV. Eouc. REV. 572 (1976). 
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pressures that impede direct responses to the educational needs of 
minority children. 
In the United States, the ringing promise of equal educational 
opportunity for black children · through integration with whites has 
not been implemented because of white opposition, much of it moti-
vated by the fear that integrated schools would narrow the educa-
tional opportunities of white children. 
In England, the numbers of nonwhite children were, until rela-
tively recently, so small that policymakers concluded that their 
schooling could be accomplished through racially nonspecific 
processes. Kirp reports it was not until about 1960 that Great Britain 
began to experience a significan~ immigration of nonwhite peoples 
from the "new Commonwealth" countries of India, Pakistan, Ban-
gladesh and the West Indies. As the percentage of nonwhite resi-
dents increased, Britain appeared to recognize its new multicultural 
and multiracial character, but felt that the responsibilities that ac-
companied such diversity could be carried out under the general pol-
icies under which the self-styled "Welfare State" had assumed to 
insure the collective well-being of all its inhabitants. 
Britain, Kirp tells us, felt a sense of obligation to these less well 
educated, working-class immigrants, but it also felt it important not 
to single out one group for special treatment to avoid charges of fa-
voritism. "Moreover, Britons did not regard this group as having a 
particular claim on the public fisc. The dilemmas of social class 
were familiar; the unique dilemmas of race were not generally ac-
knowledged" (p. 23). 
To be successful, the official policy on race also had to be respon-
sive to the tensions between the actual and the preferred self images 
of the English people. From all indications, the British still harbor a 
paranoid resentment at the loss of their imperial grandeur. On the 
one hand, they regard themselves as a superior people. This is evi-
denced by their paternalistic rule in the past and, as will be shown 
here, their high-handed approach to race relations in the present. 
But the British also perceive themselves as a very tolerant, liberal 
people. They are quick to distinguish their treatment of nonwhites 
from that of the United States by noting the lack of an official dis-
criminatory policy based on race. It is true, there is no official Jim 
Crow policy in modem England. However, tolerance to the British 
means encouraging complete cultural assimilation of nonwhites, not 
an acceptance of distinctive identities. The latter, Kirp points out, 
would require the hosts themselves to change. The British policy of 
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racial inexplicitness represents a compromise among all these con-
cerns. 
Racial inexplicitness is a deliberate policy to "diminish the sig-
nificance of race, to act insofar as was possible without explicit atten-
tion to race by noting the shared and nonracial vulnerabilities of 
needy people" (p. 24). It is an official recognition of the existence of 
nonwhites and their special needs without a commitment to work 
with or for minorities, as minorities. In fact, the policy is so "neu-
tral" as to race that its nonwhite beneficiaries were not consulted 
during the determination of this governmental response to their 
needs. Kirp attributes this lack of input to the politically disorga-
nized and culturally dissimilar nonwhite community. Perhaps. But 
the lack of consultation also reflects a continuation of the paternalis-
tic attitudes of the British toward their colored citizens. 
Professor Kirp's attraction to racially inexplicit school policies is 
not lessened by the presumptions that accompany their imposition 
on nonwhite people. Patronizing means are evidently justified to 
reach educationally impressive ends. And public education in Brit-
ain has come a long way in a few generations. 
Professor Kirp reports that the roots of British race and schooling 
policy lie in the transition from an elitist to an egalitarian philosophy 
of education. Until the post-World War II era, the elitist philosophy 
dominated. Education was provided strictly along class lines. While 
a grade school education was available to most children, albeit for a 
fee, few lower or middle class children continued their education be-
yond age fourteen. The philosophy of education for the lower 
classes, which was to teach them to discharge the duties assigned 
them, reflected this elitism. The 1944 Education Act marked the 
transition to a more egalitarian approach to public education. The 
Act provided for a universal education to age sixteen, abolished fees 
in state-maintained schools, and ended the distinction between ele-
mentary and secondary schools. This more egalitarian attitude ena-
bled more careful consideration of educational needs of poorer, 
nonwhite children than would have been possible in the pre-Educa-
tion Act era. 
The policy of racial inexplicitness has been carried out within the 
context of egalitarian reform of public education. "The aim of Brit-
ish policy has been, on the one hand, to stress the infinitely diverse 
needs of individual students, and, on the other, to imbed race in 
some broader policy context, such as educational disadvantage" (p. 
40). For example, educational services destined almost exclusively 
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for nonwhite children, such as intensive instruction in the English 
language, were described as programs for "special needs" children. 
The original rationale for special attention was to promote assim-
ilation, to "render the newcomers at ease with their surroundings by 
making them over into Britons" (p. 45). But, by the mid- l 960s, 
"[t]he rhetoric of assimilation was ultimately too inconsistent with 
presumed British tolerance of diversity, and too unpalatable to non-
whites, to endure - at least as official policy" (p. 46). A new policy 
called for equal opportunity accompanied by cultural diversity in an 
atmosphere of mutual tolerance. 
In reality, K.irp concedes, there has been minimal tolerance and 
recognition of cultural differences. School officials resisted sugges-
tions that native languages be taught in the schools. Black studies 
proposals received a similarly cool reception. Such ventures were 
seen as inconsistent with the concern for integration, and in no way 
helpful in achieving the education goal. "Multiculturalism was ap-
parently to be confined to the symbolic gesture . . . . To do other-
wise," K.irp was told, "risked catering to intellectual weakness, as 
well as promoting social divisiveness" (p. 48). Educational improve-
ment and becoming familiar with British ways were seen as synony-
mous. 
By the late 1960s, as a result of the increasingly restrictive (and 
racist) British immigration laws, there were far fewer "newcomers." 
However, minorities continued to perform more poorly in school 
than their white counterparts. The discouraging achievement scores 
did not shake school officials' commitment to racially inexplicit solu-
tions for the problems of minority children, who were first desig-
nated "urban deprived children," and later "educationally 
disadvantaged children" (p. 49). 
Kirp reports that factors of belief and bureaucracy undergird ra-
cially inexplicit school policies. First, there is a deep-seated ideologi-
cal commitment to universalism in social services. The British feel 
that there is a social stigma placed on having to declare oneself 
needy as a prerequisite to receiving schooling or medical care. They 
feel that such selectivity equates need with fault and stigmatizes the 
recipient. In a universalist view, an "individual's entitlement to so-
cial service has no relationship to social status . . ." (p. 58). When 
faced with limited resources, which by necessity requires some "posi-
tive discrimination," the allocation of such scarce resources is done 
by choosing some-needy area rather than needy individuals. 
Second, there is a pronounced political and bureaucratic pref er-
ence for consensual and incremental decision making. Consultation 
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is a way of life in Britain and change occurs through nuances rather 
than through bold initiatives. There is a partnership between the 
Department of Education and Science (DES) and local school au-
thorities which illustrates the preference for consensual decision 
making. K.irp notes tha.t such an approach to decision making effec-
tively limits race specific policy initiatives because officials would re-
gard them as too dramatic. 
DES has continued to pursue a policy of inexplicitness with re-
spect to race and schooling, and has consistently defined educational 
problems posed by the nonwhite presence in nonracial terms: as re-
flecting language difficulties or a lack of cultural familiarity, or as an 
indistinguishable aspect of the dilemmas associated with educational 
disadvantage generally. This approach has been presumed "likely to 
achieve more for racial minorities in the long run, and with rather 
less social pain, than the alternative of a more overtly racial focus" 
(p. 54). Adhering to this rubric, DES has been unwilling even to 
maintain a count of nonwhites in British schools. 
K.irp does not :find that the British policy of "doing good by 
stealth" (p. 65) has served to provide nonwhites with tangible bene-
fits in school funding. Nevertheless, he questions whether Britain's 
racial minorities would have been better served by a British 
equivalent of the more specific American programs like Title I of the 
1965 Elementary and Secondary Education Act, in which bookkeep-
ing concerns as to whether eligible children were benefiting have 
often taken precedence over educational concerns. He thinks racial 
inexplicitness can best be appreciated as "one plausible approach to 
a set of immensely troubling issues" (p. 66). 
The British commitment to racially inexplicit school policies was 
likely strengthened by their unhappy experiments with busing. Ac-
tually, a prerequisite for racially neutral policies is a relatively small 
percentage of minorities, and nonwhites constitute only about 4% of 
the primary and secondary British population (p. 1 ). In addition, 
inexplicit policies are a comfortable means of proceeding with an 
unorganized minority community. Yet by the 1960s, substantial 
numbers of nonwhites had settled, in particular London suburbs, 
threatening these foundations of racially neutral policies. When the 
Beaconsfield Road School became 60% nonwhite, white parents 
organized to protest the "racial invasion," and "hostilities between 
whites and Indians flared" (p. 74). Perhaps in part to insure the con-
tinuance of the small percentage, unorganized minority community 
model, the dispersal via busing of 3,000 nonwhite children was be-
gun. 
842 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 79:835 
The British government turned to busing as a means to prevent 
schools from becoming "irretrievably immigrant" schools (p. 74). 
There were no claims that busing would improve the educational 
opportunities or achievements of nonwhite students, and white stu-
dents were never considered for busing. The sole purpose was to 
"render newcomers relatively invisible and hence unthreatening to 
whites" (p. 75). DES saw dispersal as "enabling nonwhites to 'fit in 
with reasonable ease,' " indicating that "[r]acial invisibility . . . was 
good for nonwhites as well as whites" (p. 76). 
In the London borough of Ealing, the busing experiment was 
taken very seriously. A substantial amount of effort and expense was 
invested in the program. Nonwhite children underwent elaborate 
testing to assess their knowledge of English before they were trans-
ferred to white schools. Specially trained teachers were hired to 
teach English to those children experiencing problems with it. Non-
white students were admitted to grammar schools on the basis of 
their intellectual promise despite grades which would not ordinarily 
have entitled them to admission, a fact Kirp suggests indicates a will-
ingness to undertake extraordinary measures on behalf of nonwhites. 
In 1975 a DES official praised the program highly, both for the qual-
ity of education received by the nonwhite students and for the exper-
iment in race relations (p. 89). The success of the busing project in 
Ealing became a source of pride for local school officials. They came 
to see dispersal as done for the benefit of immigrant children rather 
than for the original purpose of allaying the "immigrant takeover" 
fears of whites. 
In the United States, busing is urged by civil rights lawyers as the 
best means to insure equal educational opportunity for black chil-
dren. But in practice, so many concessions must be made to meet the 
fears and concerns of whites in the integrated school that few inte-
grated schools can boast of real academic improvement for its black 
students. In the meantime, white resistance to the busing program 
continues. 
In Britain, too, there was discontent almost immediately. Some 
local school officials were upset because the DES initiative seemed to 
ignore, or even to usurp, their role in the traditional governance 
partnership. There were also the usual administrative difficulties as-
sociated with large-scale busing. And even nonwhite parents, who 
initially had accepted the policy, began to complain that busing was 
discriminatory and insulting. They claimed that busing denied 
them, as nonwhite parents, the choices of schools available to white 
parents. Political considerations also forced a reconsideration of the 
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program. Nonwhites in these areas represented 30% of the popula-
tion (up from 10%). DES officials found there were too few white 
children in the area to maintain the designated proportion of whites, 
and they deemed busing white children to be politically unfeasible. 
By the late 1970s, DES had abandoned its dispersal program, 
leaving the policy choice of whether to continue busing in local 
hands. In Southall, the local authorities decided to build new 
schools which would primarily serve nonwhite children; construction 
was now a " politically easier course of action than trying somehow 
to press on with busing" (p. 92). Ealing authorities had decided to 
follow suit when they were sued by the government's Select Commit-
tee on Race Relations and Immigration. The Committee charged 
that busing and the whole dispersal policy was discriminatory be-
cause it was based on race rather than educational need. In 1978 the 
parties settled, with Ealing agreeing to disperse "only on grounds of 
demonstrated educational need, not race" (p. 99). Kirp suggests that 
busing was a deviation from the traditional British policy of inex-
plicitness, and was ultimately abandoned because of "an ideologi-
cally and politically rooted reluctance to single out nonwhites for 
any purpose, whether allegedly benevolent or malign" (p. 71 ). 
In summary, Kirp states that in the fifteen years since racial inex-
plicitness has been the predominant social policy as regards race, 
nonwhites have made considerable progress. "The race relations cli-
mate is more hopeful and there is less overt discrimination" (p. 114). 
He dismisses the minimal gains of minorities in economic and social 
mobility after a decade of this policy, stating that the goal of an edu-
cational policy of inexplicitness is to educate, not to remake the so-
cial order. 
Kirp does acknowledge that "there remain substantial gaps be-
tween the groups. Some of these gaps are attributable to disadvan-
tage associated with race" (p. 114). However, he says that it is 
difficult to determine whether a more vigorous and directed public 
policy would have caused an even greater amelioration of racial ine-
qualities. 
Kirp ends his discussion with a comparison of the British and the 
American approaches to race. After detailing the historical and 
demographic differences between the two, Kirp describes the differ-
ences between decision making processes. The United States ad-
heres to a legalist approach. The judiciary and administrative 
agencies act as problem solvers and as the primary enforcers of the 
law. In England, Parliament controls the decision making process. 
Administrative agencies such as DES use informal inquiry and ad 
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hoc agreements to determine policy rather than making court-like 
statements of right. 
Despite these differences, Kirp seems to think that the United 
States may be leaning toward a policy of racial inexplicitness. There 
is a current trend toward less emphasis on race and more on eco-
nomic discrimination. Racial explicitness, at least with respect to 
hiring and university admissions, provokes hostility, and Kirp inter-
prets Justice Powell's opinion in the Supreme Court's Bakke deci-
sion 12 as enunciating a "constitutional value in not being too race-
specific" (p. 128). In other words, there is an "insist[ence] upon inex-
plicitness as the constitutionally mandated policy choice" (p. 128). 
As for Britain, Kirp perceives there a combining of "the consid-
erable virtues of inexplicitness with both a greater willingness to in-
corporate nonwhite groups into the relevant decision making and 
consultative apparatuses, and a recognition that discrimination . . . 
deserves more serious public policy attention than it has thus far re-
ceived (p. 129). He recognizes that effective civil rights policies re-
quire that "attention be paid to practices which, while not overtly 
racial, nonetheless operate to disadvantage racial minorities without 
adequate justification" (pp. 129-30). But he holds to the view that 
racial inexplicitness need not necessarily imply inattentiveness. 
This point of view, Kirp acknowledges, places old civil rights 
warriors in this country on their guard. They remember all too well 
the "benign neglect" admonition of Daniel Moynihan during the 
early 1970s. Kirp suggests that Moynihan may simply have been 
urging that more civil rights progress could be made if less public 
attention were focused on the issue. Nevertheless, civil rights liberals 
viewed Moynihan's suggestion as a morally bankrupt response to 
America's history of discrimination. 
Civil rights leaders are not likely to be more sanguine about the 
"benign neglect" approach today, even if it is clothed in more neu-
tral "racial inexplicitness" language. In too many areas during the 
past decade, they have experienced a loss of recently won rights as a 
result of the adoption of policies facially neutral as to race, but 
which in operation have the effect of disadvantaging blacks. In a 
series of cases, the Supreme Court has held that such policies do not 
violate constitutional rights unless blacks can prove that they were 
intentionally adopted to discriminate on the basis of race. 13 In many 
instances, this burden of proof is extremely difficult to meet because 
12. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
13. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
March 1981] Britain, Blacks, and Busing 845 
the policies arguably further some legitimate, nonracial goal. 14 For 
these reasons, black leaders would oppose any effort to adopt in this 
country the racially inexplicit approach Kirp finds that Britain has 
used as vigorously as they condemned the Moynihan proposal, 
which they viewed as a "calculated, aggressive and systematic effort 
... to wipe out all the civil rights gains made in the 1950s and 
1960s" (p. 109). 
And yet there is a problem. Many thoughtful blacks have won-
dered in recent years whether the direct approach in the civil rights 
field has lost its effectiveness. Professor William J. Wilson argues 
that poverty, and not racial discrimination, is now the chief obstacle 
to black progress. 15 He acknowledges that past discrimination has 
consigned a disproportionate number of blacks to permanent pov-
erty status, but he argues that more civil rights laws are not going to 
improve their condition. He warns moreover that a deepening eco-
nomic schism seems to be developing in the black community, with 
the black poor falling further and further behind middle- and upper-
income blacks. 16 It is clear that blacks with skills and education 
have been able to take best advantage of the new opportunities cre-
ated by civil rights laws and affirmative action policies. Indeed, Wil-
son suggests that the very presence of these civil rights measures 
tends to harden public resistance to the broader-scale measures 
needed to alleviate the plight of the black poor. 
Wilson views the large, black underclass as "one of the legacies 
of the racial oppression in previous years." For its remediation, he 
calls for public policy programs that attack inequality on a broad 
class front and "go beyond the limits of ethnic and racial discrimina-
tion by directly confronting the pervasive and destructive features of 
class subordination."17 In effect, Wilson is urging that racially inex-
plicit policies be adopted. Applying this standard to current school 
desegregation problems in this country, he would likely approve pol-
icies that give less emphasis to racial balance and busing, and greater 
emphasis to educational programs intended to upgrade the quality of 
schooling for blacks wherever they attend school. To the extent that 
black children remain in identifiably black institutions, educational 
improvement, rather than racial-balance remedies, would likely win 
14. See, e.g., City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), finding an at-large electoral 
system not in violation of black rights even though it serves to dilute the voting strength of 
blacks, because there was no proof that the system was intended to violate the voting rights of 
blacks. 
15. See w. WILSON, THE DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE 151-52 (1978). 
16. See id at 151-54. 
17. See id at 154. 
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his vote. The Supreme Court seems to have tried to encourage 
school desegregation policymaking along this route. 18 But most civil 
rights leaders are understandably wary that such policies would por-
tend a return to the separate but equal policies condemned in Brown, 
and they are unalterably opposed to any retreat from the right to 
maximum feasible school desegregation recognized by the Court. 19 
Interestingly enough, it is likely that both civil rights adherents 
who favor racial balance policies and those who would prefer educa-
tional improvement would be deeply suspicious of the racially inex-
plicit approach presented in .Doing Good By .Doing Little. Racism is 
too ingrained in American society to be eradicated by indirection. 
"Doing good by stealth" seems, at least in the American context, a 
contradiction in terms. A more serious problem is whether, regard-
less of the policy adopted, racial subordination which has served so 
many white interests so well can ever be eliminated. Public policy 
expert Tilden W. LeMelle doubts "whether a society such as the 
United States is really capable of legislating and enforcing effective 
public policy to combat racial discrimination" in the political process 
and elsewhere.20 And, as he suggests, history indicates that the 
United States has acted effectively against racially discriminatory 
policies only when those policies were perceived as posing a serious 
threat to the country rather than serving as useful regulators of the 
status quo.21 
In concluding .Doing Good By .Doing Little, David Kirp calls for 
public policy in the racial realm "that neither becomes officious in-
termeddling nor degenerates into mere neglect, with the result that 
race eventually ceases to be a policy problem" (p. 133). As to the 
likelihood of such policies being adopted in either nation, Kirp says 
"it is far too soon even to hazard predictions" (p. 133). Kirp may be 
right, but there is not unlimited time in which to decide whether a 
sensible as well as moral approach to race relations can be effected. 
"The fire next time" will not always be a future event. 
18. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977). 
19. See, e.g., Taylor, Columbus and Dayton: A Renewed Commitment lo Equality," 3 LE· 
GAL ANALYSIS: TRENDS IN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION LAW (Natl. Project and Task Force on 
Desegregation Strategies, Oct. I 979). 
20. LeMelle, Foreword lo R Burkey, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND PUBLIC POLICY IN THE 
UNITED STATES X (1971). 
21. D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW, § 1.12 {2d ed. 1980). 
